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Abstract
The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 (S. 139) is the most detailed effort to date to design an
economy-wide cap-and-trade system for U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The Act
caps sectors at their 2000 emissions in Phase I of the program, running from 2010 to 2015, and
then to their 1990 emissions in Phase II starting 2016. There is a strong incentive for banking of
allowances, raising the costs in Phase I to achieve savings in Phase II. Use of credits from
outside the capped sectors could significantly reduce the cost of the program, even though
limited to 15% and 10% of Phase I and II allowances respectively. These credits may come
from CO2 sequestration in soils and forests, reductions in emissions from uncapped sectors,
allowances acquired from foreign emissions trading systems, and from a special incentive
program for automobile manufacturers. The 15% and 10% limits increase the incentive for
banking and could prevent full use of cost-effective reductions from the uncapped sectors.
Moreover, some of the potential credits might contribute little or no real climate benefit,
particularly if care is not taken in defining those from forest and soil CO2 sequestration.
Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model shows that costs over
the two Phases of the program could vary substantially, depending on normal uncertainty in
economic and emissions growth, and the details of credit system implementation.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 (S. 139) is a plan to cap U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,
proposed by Senators McCain (Rep., Arizona) and Lieberman (Dem., Connecticut). The Act
would almost certainly be amended and modified in various ways were it to make it through the
legislative process. Still, the current version provides specific targets and timetables that are
subject to quantitative assessment. Here we present an analysis of the Act, with a focus on its
program for “market driven reductions in greenhouse gas emissions” as described in Title III of
the Staff Working Draft dated 9 January 2003. Titles I and II cover provisions on climate change
research and related activities and for developing a national greenhouse gas database. While these
are important topics, complementary to Title III, we do not address them. There are also many
features of Title III that are not amenable to quantitative analysis, at least with the modeling tools
at our disposal. Moreover, our analysis is primarily an aggregate economic analysis. We do not
examine the legal or regulatory implications of the Act, the specific regulatory, monitoring, and
enforcement requirements, or the economic implications for specific entities or sectors of the
economy.
We begin with a broad overview of the proposed legislation, highlighting features of the
greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade system envisioned in the Act. We next describe our
analysis approach—in particular how we have approximated features of the Act within our
MIT Emissions Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. We then proceed with a set of
scenarios intended to demonstrate the effects of key provisions, and the inevitable uncertainties
in such projections. Whether the Act ultimately succeeds or not, it represents the most detailed
effort to date to design an economy-wide cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions
reductions in the United States. As a result the drafters of the Act have had to deal with the
many issues that arise in implementing such a system. It also provides a challenge for economic
modeling to realistically capture key implementation issues.
2. PROVISIONS OF THE CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP ACT OF 2003
The Act creates its system of market driven reductions by imposing an emissions cap with
tradeable allowances. Under such a system a given number of allowances are issued, and each
entity covered by the cap must, at the end of some accounting period, possess allowances at least
equal to its emissions. In making the allowances tradeable, an entity may choose to reduce its
emissions to the level of allowances it has received, it may obtain more allowances from the
pool of those that have not been used by other entities, or it may reduce emissions below its
allowances. If the cap is binding, a market will develop that makes it reasonably straightforward
for an entity to purchase allowances to cover its emissions, or to sell any allowances it does not
need. The main example of such a system is the one covering SO2 emissions under Title IV of
2the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. That program has demonstrated that such an allowance
trading system can work effectively. In almost all quarters the SO2 trading program has been
considered a success, exceeding original expectations (see Ellerman et al., 2000).
In moving from broad concept to a real emissions trading system several design decisions
immediately arise. What emissions are covered, and when does the cap become effective?
Which entities will need to hold allowances? Where and how will emissions be monitored? How
will allowances be distributed, and what limitations or rules determine how they may be used?
For example, can they be banked for future use, and can firms borrow against future allowances?
Can credits be generated outside the system and applied against emissions from capped sources?
The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 addresses each of these issues, as discussed below.
2.1 What emissions are covered by the cap-and-trade system?
In its greenhouse gas coverage, the proposed system is consistent with the Kyoto Protocol.
It includes carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and it uses the IPCC’s
recommended global warming potential indices (GWPs) to convert emissions of different
gases into carbon dioxide equivalents. With regard to sectors of the economy, households and
agriculture are specifically exempt. All other sectors are covered, including utilities and the
industrial, commercial, transportation, and public (Federal, State, and local government) sectors.
A further exception is provided for entities that emit less than 10,000 tons of greenhouse gases
measured in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2-e). For practical purposes this limit would exempt
the commercial sector but would capture most large industrial sources. While these provisions
exclude many potential entities (millions of households and farms and tens of thousands of
businesses) the fact that most emissions are from a relatively smaller number of large sources
means that the cap would likely cover 90% of carbon dioxide emissions and about 80% of all
greenhouse gas emissions, according to the Environmental Protection Agency’s Greenhouse Gas
Inventory for the year 2000 (US EPA, 2002).
A major reason the Act covers such a large fraction of emissions is that it makes certain
entities responsible for their “indirect” emissions. The most important of these are petroleum
refiners or importers selling petroleum products for use in transportation. Without this provision
emissions from automobiles and trucking would be largely exempt. Transportation was
responsible for nearly 27% of U.S. CO2 emissions in 2000 by EPA estimates (US EPA, 2002),
and fuel use has been growing more rapidly in transportation than in other sectors. The provision
on indirect emissions also applies to hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride where producers or importers of these substances must hold an allowance for
every ton of carbon dioxide equivalent that will eventually result from their release.
3It is worthwhile to note what else is not included under the proposed cap. Carbon sources and
sinks from forests and agriculture are not accounted for under the cap, but sinks can enter as credit
offsets. In principle, large land owners such as forest companies or government agencies that own
land (e.g., the Forest Service, Interior Department, and Defense Department) could be assigned a
reference level of net emissions from land use sources and brought under the cap, but this is not a
feature of the Act although forest companies whose other greenhouse gas emissions exceeded the
10,000-ton limit are included. In calculating emissions for these entities, the intent of the Act
appears to be to exclude emissions of CO2 from forest harvesting itself because the gross emissions
from land use change are not included in the EPA inventory, which is the basis of the emissions
cap set in the Act. Land use carbon emissions are entered in the EPA inventory as a net amount,
which for the U.S. in 2000 was a sink of 902 million metric tons of CO2 (US EPA, 2002).
Other radiatively important substances (tropospheric ozone and its precursors and aerosols)
are also not included either under the cap or as a potential source of credits, because there
currently exists no ready way to compare these substances with CO2. Their inclusion in a cap-
and-trade system would require a solution to science and policy questions that have so far
stymied development of a GWP-like index for them (see, e.g., Reilly et al., 2003). The two most
important non-CO2 gases (methane and nitrous oxide) are included in principle, but in practice
many of these sources are below the 10,000-ton limit, or are from agriculture, which is
specifically excluded from the cap. Large landfills are a potentially large methane source, but
they are already controlled under recent amendments to the U.S. Clean Air Act for reasons
unrelated to climate. Except for emissions related to fossil fuel production, then, the largest
portion of non-CO2 greenhouse gases can only enter under the crediting provisions of the Act.
2.2 What is an entity?
One of the more challenging aspects of the proposed legislation is the definition of an “entity.”
The term suggests that a company would need to add up all of the emissions at all of its facilities,
whereas the terms “establishment,” “plant,” or “facility” would more likely be taken to apply to a
single building, factory, or plant complex at a contiguous site. The entity designation thus would
bring more emissions under the cap than an “establishment” designation, but how much more is
not easy to determine given the limits of available data and the difficulty in determining the exact
boundaries of an entity. Notably, firms with vehicle fleets or that directly emit HFCs, PFCs, or
SF6, would not be required, we assume, to have allowances for these emissions (and they would
not be tallied in determining the 10,000-ton limit) as the intent is to control these indirectly at the
point of production or import.
If the entity is a corporate firm, then whether its emissions total up to 10,000 tons CO2-e or not
may depend on how the business is structured. Starbucks, or McDonalds, for example, might each
4be considered a single entity, but some of the retail establishments that carry their names are part
of the corporation while others are franchises operating under license. It seems likely that such
franchises would be considered as separate entities. Other corporate structures, such as joint
ventures, could raise similar issues. Which entity is responsible for space conditioning emissions
may depend on whether the space is owned or leased, and who purchases fuel under the terms
of any lease. Inclusion of the public sector raises issues of definition as well. Is the Federal
government or each state government a single entity, or are departments, agencies, legislative,
judicial, and educational systems (e.g., state university systems) each separate entities? These issues
are unlikely to be completely resolved unless and until actual implementation occurs. For the bulk
of U.S. emissions these distinctions may not matter very much. But establishing which entities are
subject to the cap would involve a considerable burden for corporations and the regulating agency.
The Act recognizes that entities might have an incentive to restructure themselves to remain
under the 10,000-ton limit, and prohibits companies from doing so. This provision may prevent
obvious ploys to stay under the limit. But companies are continually making decisions about the
structure of their organizations, and it would seem nearly impossible to determine whether staying
below this limit was a factor in any particular decision. For example, growing and persistent costs
of meeting a target could tilt the balance in an electric market from a central-grid utility to micro-
turbines generating combined heat and power that would then be small enough to be exempt.
A central utility may not be involved in these small-scale investments, and might actually lose
market as a result. Thus leakage from the cap might result not from specific actions by covered
entities but as the result of competitive forces created in part by the exclusion. Whether such
leakage is likely, or could become significant under some situations, is a subject for further
evaluation, and would need to be monitored over time.
2.3 What is the cap and when does it become effective?
The intent of the Act is that, during a Phase I of implementation, the aggregate cap for covered
entities will be the total of their 2000 emissions, with the cap dropping to the total of their 1990
emissions in Phase II. Phase I runs from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2015, and the Act
specifies an annual cap of 5896 million metric tons CO2-e less the calendar-year 2000 emissions
of non-covered entities. For Phase II (January 1, 2016 onward) the cap is 5123 million metric
tons CO2-e less calendar-year 1990 emissions of non-covered entities. The caps of 5896 and 5123
million metric tons are based on the U.S. inventory of greenhouse gases (US EPA, 2002, Table
ES-4) and represent U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases, less the exempt sectors (households
and agriculture) and less emissions from U.S. territories. The exact numerical cap depends on a
determination of the non-covered entities and their emissions in 2000 and 1990. Its calculation will
require the estimation of historical figures for the years 2000 and 1990, once entities are defined.
5The apparent intent of the Act in setting Phase II limits (which the Kyoto Protocol does not
do) is to provide guidance to entities of what to expect after Phase I. Section 336 of Title III
requires the Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere to evaluate the adequacy
of the target at least every two years, and report the findings to Congress. In our reading, this
leaves open the possibility that even the Phase II cap could be altered, if it was deemed
inadequate upon further consideration. However, by specifying specific numerical targets the
intent of the Act also appears to be to hold to them unless compelling evidence emerges of a
need for change. Also, evaluations of adequacy of the target would help in the formulation of
targets for a Phase III of the program.
2.4 Where and how will emissions be monitored, and which specific entities will need to
hold allowances?
In discussions of potential carbon cap-and-trade programs, the pros and cons of upstream
versus downstream programs have been argued extensively. Because there are limited options
for removing carbon at the point of combustion, the main exception being carbon capture and
sequestration at power plants, an upstream system (requiring allowances when the fuel is
produced, imported or refined) would not, it is generally believed, foreclose many reduction
options. Fuel producers would roll the cost of acquiring allowances into fuel product prices and
these higher prices for fuels, reflecting their carbon content, would cause energy consumers to
conserve or to switch to energy sources with lower carbon emissions.
An upstream system is typically seen as preferable for reasons of administrative and transaction
costs. The number of producers and importers that would need to be considered in an upstream
system probably numbers only a few thousand, whereas a complete downstream system could
require each of millions of households to turn in allowances with each energy purchase, as would
tens of thousands of commercial and industrial energy users.
The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 envisions a mixed upstream and downstream system,
referred to as “indirect” and “direct” emissions, but it is mostly downstream. It is upstream only
for emissions from transportation fuels and HFCs, PFCs, and SF6, but downstream for all
emissions from other refined oil products, natural gas, and coal. By its exemption of households,
farms and small sources, the Act avoids the potential transactions costs of requiring tens of
millions of energy users to each comply separately. Of course, if an upstream system for natural
gas and other oil products were proposed instead, all of these millions of exempted energy users
would fall under the cap automatically. This convenient feature is imposed only for transportation,
since refiners and importers must hold allowances for transport fuels even if their direct emissions
are less than 10,000 tons. This mixed downstream/upstream division can create many problems.
For example, it requires refiners to separately identify transportation and non-transportation fuels,
6and creates the possibility that downstream users may purchase fuel oil and use it as diesel fuel,
since there is little substantive difference between them.
The Act anticipates that in some cases (e.g., electric utilities) there will be direct measurement
of CO2 from flue gases, but recognizes that other methods will be needed to deal with some
sources. Carbon coefficients will be required for different fuels, as is the case in constructing the
national inventory. These estimates would then be applied to quantities of purchased fuel to
determine emissions.
2.5 How will allowances be distributed?
Two broad approaches are available for distributing allowances under a cap-and-trade system:
(1) free distribution, also called “grandfathering” when distributed to incumbent emitting facilities
as is usually the case; and (2) auctioning by some agency of the Federal government that receives
the revenue.
All existing cap-and-trade programs to date have allocated allowances free of charge to
incumbent emitters, typically based on past activity levels (not emissions). For instance,
allowances for the SO2 trading program are allocated according to average annual fossil-fuel heat
input in 1985-87 multiplied by a specified “allowed” emission rate. While free allocation is
sometimes justified as a form of compensation to those most adversely affected by the measure,
many other considerations intrude, such as earlier abatement action and various notions of
fairness. Moreover, the cost incidence of a greenhouse gas constraint may fall downstream or
upstream from the entity that actually is required to hold allowances. For example, under the
proposed Act electric utilities are required to hold allowances. But, the incidence of any costs
directly borne by utilities will be divided between shareholders of the utilities, consumers of
electric power, and industries that supply utilities (particularly coal producers). As a result, various
proposals have been made to allocate allowances (freely) to parties other than incumbent emitters,
who would then sell the allowances to those required to hold them for compliance purposes.
Auctioning avoids the problem of directly allocating allowances, although in reality the
problem is only removed one stage since the auction revenues will be used in some manner.
The main reason for the attention given to auctioning, particularly in the economic literature,
has been the possibility of obtaining a “double dividend” by using the auction revenue to reduce
distortionary taxes on labor and capital (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg, 1999; Bovenberg and
Goulder, 2003). These benefits might arise because existing taxes discourage the supply of labor
and capital, thereby lowering income and economic activity. Various studies have indicated that
the use of auction revenue to offset taxes on wages or capital could partially (or in some cases
when reductions from reference are small, completely) offset the economy-wide costs of the
greenhouse gas reduction program (Babiker et al., 2003). Underlying this proposal is the idea that:
7(1) there is need for Federal government revenue at some given level; (2) existing taxes discourage
“good” activity, namely, the supply of labor and capital; and (3) while environmental taxes or
their auction equivalent will discourage “bad” activity. Because much of this literature imagines
a reduction in existing taxes while Federal spending remains constant, the implicit assumption is
that the current level of Federal revenue is the desirable one. The correct level of Federal spending
is open to continuing debate, however, and decisions on the use of a revenue stream from
allowance auctions would almost inevitably take place in the context of the broader debate on the
proper level of Federal spending and the appropriate structure of taxation. These issues are well
beyond the scope of this paper, but they are not irrelevant to the economic consequences of the Act.
The Act describes a complex allowance allocation involving a mix of free allocation and
auctioning. In the first step of the process the Secretary of Commerce would make a division
between allowances to be auctioned by a newly created Climate Change Credit Corporation
(CCCC) and those to be distributed without charge by the Environmental Protection Agency.
After transferring those to be auctioned to the CCCC, the remaining allowances would be
divided among early action claimants and incumbents. The Act lays out a process by which
entities could receive allowances for reductions in emissions achieved prior to Phase I, and these
entities would have first claim on allowances allocated to the EPA Administrator. Any remaining
allowances would be distributed at the discretion of the EPA Administrator with some guidance
in the Act on what factors to consider. Considering the discretion of Executive Branch agencies
and the influence of firm behavior before the start of Phase I, a very wide range of allocations
could result from this process. If the Secretary of Commerce retains few allowances for auction
and few early action allowances are claimed or allowed by entities, the EPA Administrator could
have a large number to allocate in some manner to the affected entities. But, there is nothing to
prevent all of the Phase I allowances to be claimed by early action and the auction, such that few
or none were left for distribution at the discretion of the EPA Administrator.
Except for possible “double dividend” effects, the exact distribution of allowances likely
would matter little from an economic efficiency standpoint. Thus the inability to predict the
allocation does not directly affect our ability to conduct an aggregate economic analysis.
Individual entities have much at stake, of course, in how the allowances are distributed.
Three elements of the allocation mechanism are worth pointing out for their effects on the
efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed system. First, any allowances allocated for “early
action” are deducted from the Phase I’s 5896-million metric tons CO2-e less emissions of
non-covered entities. Early-action allowances thus only affect how much of the fixed target each
entity receives and do not loosen the Phase I (or II) target in any way. Allowances awarded for
early action can be used like any other allowances. In contrast, registries for early action have
sometimes been envisioned as a bank of allowances that would apply over and above a specified
8future target. If that were the case, generous interpretation of early action could create a bank that
would make the target much looser.
Second, early action credits may result in some environment benefit prior to the formal start
of Phase I, as entities reduce below what their reference emissions would otherwise have been in
those years. The real benefit may never be known because the result depends on the extent to
which the rules defining these early action allowances can ensure real reductions. The language
of the Act indicates that an historical peak, apparently chosen by the entity but subject to review
by EPA, will be the reference. This procedure favors allocating early action allowances to entities
whose emissions for one reason or another might have declined anyway. The total number of
allowances thus allocated (or claimed) will likely be an overestimate of the real reductions
occurring prior to Phase I. It could also be argued that this provision discourages entities from
avoiding emissions reductions prior to Phase I, in hopes of getting a larger allocation.
Third, the decision to auction a certain share of the total target could influence the
macroeconomic costs through the “double dividend” effect. Although use of the auction proceeds
to reduce labor and capital taxes directly seems to be precluded by the organization of the CCCC,
the allocation of some portion of auction revenues to the Treasury, to compensate for reduced
tax revenue due to the reduced economic activity resulting from the emission restrictions, could
indirectly have the same effect by avoiding a compensatory increase of taxes on labor or capital.
Only a general basis for the Commerce Secretary’s decision is given, principally to reduce the
costs borne by consumers. The Act does not instruct the Secretary to consider these “double
dividend” effects, in contrast to transition assistance and various subsidies to encourage energy
efficiency and thereby reduce the cost incidence of the greenhouse gas emission restriction on
consumers. The Act specifies that 20% of the auction revenue for 2010 should be used for
transition assistance to dislocated workers and communities, with the amount to be phased out at
2% per year thereafter. The language of the Act clearly suggests efforts such as making energy
efficient appliances affordable to consumers. The Act also allows the Secretary to preferentially
treat those consumers least able to afford the increased costs. Thus, with little guidance as to
whether 10% or 90% of allowances will be auctioned, and a variety of objectives for the revenues
raised, there is little basis for assessing the macroeconomic effects of any revenues it might yield.
2.6 What limitations or rules exist regarding how allowances may be used?
The Act allows unlimited banking (holding allowances for future periods), limited borrowing
(using future reductions to offset current emissions), and prohibits the CCCC from retiring unused
allowances. The borrowing provision is limited to specific entities that undertake a long-lived
capital investment to reduce emissions. An example might be an electric utility that retrofits
carbon capture and sequestration equipment on a coal-fired power plant. Borrowing may be useful
for some entities, but in aggregate, as we will see in the following sections, the economic incentive
9is likely to be toward net banking. The prohibition on retiring allowances prevents the CCCC
from unilaterally lowering the number of allowances available, but little other guidance is given.
The CCCC “shall buy and sell tradeable allowances whether allocated to it..., or obtained by
purchase, trade, or donation from other entities.” It is not required to sell all of the allowances it
holds in any specific period—i.e., while it could not retire Phase I allowances, it appears that
nothing would prohibit the Corporation from holding some of the allowances for sale in future
phases of the program.
It is not obvious what motivation the CCCC would have to purchase allowances. It is not
directed to try to maximize its revenue in any period, or over time, nor is it instructed to play a
role in “stabilizing” allowance prices. It thus seems to have a mandate to auction all allowances
soon after it receives them. A more active role in the market would need to stem from a set of
goals developed by the Corporation board itself. Our presumption for the quantitative analysis
that follows is that it would play a passive role, auctioning the allowances it receives in Phase I
(and future Phases) well before Phase I (or subsequent Phases) end, allowing private market
participants to bank or trade among themselves as the economics dictate.
2.7 What if any provisions apply to sources not covered by the cap-and-trade system, and
can credits be generated outside the system and applied against emissions from
capped sources?
Under the Act all exempt sectors and sources can create credits applicable against the
emissions cap. Credits can be derived from both CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gas reductions
from exempt sources; credits can be gained from forest and agricultural sinks for carbon; and
credits can be obtained from a foreign cap-and-trade system.
At this point, parties to the Kyoto Protocol, specifically the European Union (EU), seem the
more likely nations to have some form of cap-and-trade system. In the quantitative analysis
below, we evaluate the possible linking of the U.S. cap-and-trade system with a non-U.S.
system. As stated in the Act, the foreign system would have to be certified by the Secretary of
Commerce. Two considerations are likely to apply: integrity and comparable effort. The most
basic requirement is that the system with which trade is to be established possess sufficient
integrity in terms of monitoring, compliance, and enforcement that a foreign allowance used for
compliance in the U.S. will ensure a ton of greenhouse gas emissions reduction. The trickier
consideration is likely to be whether trade should be allowed with a cap-and-trade system in a
country that is believed not to be making a comparable effort towards reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, even if its trading system possessed the requisite integrity. While trading with such
a partner would reduce costs for the U.S. and result in no greater emissions than would occur
otherwise, recognition would also confer the benefits of trade on the other party and thereby
reward it for not adopting a more ambitious target. While comparability of effort will
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undoubtedly be a consideration, the criteria for establishing comparability are not obvious. For
instance, should the same effort be expected of China or India as might be expected of Europe?
Also, whether trade with a certified non-U.S. system would lead to lower prices in the U.S.,
as seems to be commonly assumed, is not obvious. The most likely candidate, the proposed EU
system, provides a good example. It is easy to create low-price scenarios for the EU system,
and commensurately little effort by sources located within EU member states, due to a liberal
treatment of excess allowances held by East European accession countries or Russia and of
credits from the Clean Development Mechanism. But, on the other hand, the acceptability of
these off-system credits is currently a matter of debate within Europe precisely because a liberal
acceptance of the Kyoto mechanisms would result in little emission reduction effort within
the current 15 EU member states. It is possible to envisage a situation, as is done by some
participants in the proposed system, in which few off-system credits are accepted and the large
sources now included in the trading system are made to bear a disproportionate share of the
burden of meeting the Kyoto targets. The emissions price could be higher than the price in
the U.S. system, and U.S. prices would rise as a result of international permit trade.
The availability of credits from exempt sources and from sinks within the U.S. raises similar
problems in that the key to potential supply is the determination of a reference point from which
credits are to be calculated. In the case of exempt sectors and entities, this reference must be
established for each entity. Moreover, entities may choose whether or not to participate. Those
entities whose reference point is relatively high compared to what their emissions would have
been in the absence of the credit system clearly have an incentive to participate, but the credits
may not represent real reductions. The credit system also exacerbates problems of leakage.
One forest landholder may plant trees to sequester carbon, rather than harvest timber, and thereby
claim credits. To fill the supply for timber, however, another forest-land holder may increase its
harvesting, increasing CO2 emissions.
Even more problematic for sink credits is the fact that, in the year 2000, net terrestrial CO2 sinks
in the U.S. were 902 million metric tons. One way to think about the net sink for the U.S. is that it
is the total of all uptake of CO2 in forests and on farmland (the gross sink) less emissions of CO2
from forest harvesting or other land use. The current U.S. inventory approach does not estimate the
annual gross sink and annual emissions but instead considers the change in the total stock of carbon,
an equally valid way to estimate the net sink for the U.S. as whole (see EPA, 2002). In a credit
system, however, any entity whose land is a sink might claim credit for it, whereas those entities
whose land use resulted in emissions of CO2 could choose not to participate in the credit system.1
                                                 
1
 Suppose there were three entities in a country we will call Forestland. Entity 1 sequesters 2000 tons of CO2, Entity 2
sequesters 500 tons of CO2, and Entity 3 harvests forests and causes emissions of 2000 ton of CO2. Net carbon
sequestration for Forestland is 2000+500-2000=500. But, with crediting rather than capping, if the reference point
for calculating credits was 0 net emissions, then Entities 1 and 2 could register for 2500 credits, 2000 more than
the net sequestration of the entire country, and Entity 3 would have no incentive to register its emissions.
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The total uptake of only those entities with sinks is likely to considerably larger than the net sink
for the total U.S. The reference level for each entity from which credits for sequestration were
calculated would thus need to include a specific estimate of each entity’s likely sequestration in
a business-as-usual scenario, and credits could only be earned for reductions beyond these
amounts if the system is to avoid crediting a large number of “no reduction” credits.
The Act restricts the amount of credits that can be used to no more than 15% of any entity’s
allowances in Phase I, dropping to 10% in Phase II. If the crediting system was thus very loose,
there is an ultimate limit on credits flowing into the system. While the percentages are enforced
entity-by-entity, with a well-developed market these constraints should readily translate to an
aggregate limit. That is, entities could readily swap credits for allowances such that no entity
was above the 15% limit individually, and on aggregate the 15% limit was not exceeded.
Another provision of the Act would allocate credits to automobile manufacturers who
improve fuel efficiency of their vehicle fleet beyond that required by the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards. To receive credits automobile manufactures would need to exceed
the fleet average CAFE fuel economy standards by 20%. If they exceeded the limits by only 10%
or 15% they would receive no credit. If they exceeded by 20% then they would receive credits
for savings related to the entire improvement. There is thus a highly discontinuous marginal
benefit of exceeding the standard by exactly 20%, and then a lower but nearly constant marginal
benefit for exceeding the limit by more than that percentage. An improvement in fuel efficiency
would save carbon emissions over the entire life of the car. The Act assigns the Secretary of
Transportation the task of arriving at a method for estimating the number of credits applicable
if the 20% improvement in fuel-efficiency is met. This provision, combined with inclusion of
transportation fuel in the cap-and-trade system, creates a double incentive for reducing fuel use
in automobiles. Although marginal costs would still be equalized within the trading system once
established, marginal costs would not be equalized with respect to the status quo ante since more
abatement would be obtained from the transportation sector than would occur without this
subsidy to improved fuel efficiency.
We have not been able to model this credit process directly within the EPPA model. At this
point, there is little basis, of which we are aware, to estimate automobile manufacturer and
consumer response to a financial incentive to increase fuel efficiency of vehicles. It may make
sense for some automobile manufacturers to exceed the CAFE limit for their fleet, but not for
others. What we have done, instead, is to estimate an economic incentive per vehicle in an
imagined manufacturer’s fleet. This involves making some assumptions about how the Secretary
of Transportation would credit reductions. We have followed the following approach for
estimating the value of the credit:
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where t is an index for the year, starting with the first year of the program as year 0, CL is the
estimated car life, r is the discount rate, and CO2Savings are calculated by estimating the gasoline
savings obtained with the higher average fleet mileage times the CO2 emission coefficient for
gasoline. We have assumed for simplicity that the lifetime mileage of cars is not affected by the
efficiency improvement, although the Dept. of Transportation may wish to make such an estimate.
Given the banking provision, the expectation would be that the CO2-e price would rise at
the discount rate. We can thus substitute the expression [(1+r)t × CO2ePrice0] for expression
[CO2ePricet]. With this substitution the [(1+r)t] term appears in both the denominator and
numerator and cancels out of the equation, and the CO2-e price is just the price in year 0 and
can thus be moved outside the summation sign. The expression reduces to simply:
CreditValue CO e ice CO Savings
t
t CL
=
=
=
∑2 0 2
0
Pr
for vehicle fleet savings in the first year of the program. It is that year’s CO2-e price times the
summed CO2 savings over the lifetime of the vehicle fleet sold in that year. In each succeeding
year, the formula is simply the CO2-e price for that year times the estimated accumulated savings.
Or, as the Act is written, the Secretary of Transportation would award credits equal to undiscounted
estimated cumulative savings over the life of the vehicle, and the automobile manufacturer could
sell these into the allowance trading system at the going price (or bank them). It may turn out that
the CO2-e price in reality rises at different rates because of unexpected changes in the economy,
but given the banking provision the best estimate is that it will rise at the discount rate, and this
assumption eliminates the need to make an explicit forward estimate of the price.
3. THE EMISSIONS PREDICTION AND POLICY ANALYSIS (EPPA) MODEL
To analyze the Act we apply the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA)
Model. It is a recursive-dynamic multi-regional general equilibrium model of the world economy
(Babiker et al., 2001). The version of EPPA used here has been updated in a number of ways
from the model described in Babiker et al. (2001). It includes non-CO2 greenhouse gases, greater
disaggregation in the electric sector, and updated evaluation of economic growth and resource
availability (Hyman, 2001; Hyman et al., 2003; McFarland et al., 2003; Reilly et al., 2003).2 It is
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 Oil and gas resources were updated to be consistent with a recent USGS re-evaluation (USGS, 2000). The electric
sector was revised to include separation of hydroelectricity from other conventional sources based on IEA data
(IEA, 2001), reformulation of the backstop renewable electric sector, and addition of a biomass electric
generation technology. China’s energy and emissions outlook was revised to be consistent with reports of recent
trends. Near term economic growth prospects were revised to be consistent with the most recent IMF global
outlook, and compared with Babiker et al. (2001) energy efficiency trends in developing countries were revised
to reflect historical data, which show little or no improvement in the energy intensity of GDP.
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built on the GTAP data set, which accommodates a consistent representation of energy markets
in physical units as well as detailed accounts of regional production and bilateral trade flows
(Hertel, 1997). The version of the model used here has recently been updated to GTAP5-E, with
a base year for the model of 1997. GTAP5-E includes the most recent input-output tables for the
U.S. From 2000 onward, EPPA is solved recursively at 5-year intervals.
For purposes of this assessment, a significant feature of the model is the inclusion of the cost
of abatement of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6). The cost
calculations consider both the emissions mitigation that occurs as a byproduct of actions directed
at CO2, and reductions resulting from gas-specific control measures. Targeted control measures
include reductions in the emissions of: CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels; the industrial
gases that replace CFCs controlled by the Montreal Protocol and produced at aluminum smelters;
CH4 from energy supply and use, landfills, and sewage; and N2O from chemical production.
Limited reduction possibilities from agriculture also are included for control of CH4 from manure
management in large concentrated livestock operations, and N2O reductions from the improved
management of inorganic fertilizer applications. Because of a lack of proven technologies and/or
the difficulty of measurement and monitoring we do not consider reductions in process CO2 from
cement production, N2O from organic nitrogen application and fossil fuel combustion, or CH4
from ruminant digestion and manure management on small farms. More detail on how abatement
costs are represented for these substances is provided in Hyman et al. (2003).
Non-energy activities are aggregated to four sectors, as shown in Table 1. The energy sector,
which contributes to emissions of several of the non-CO2 gases as well as to CO2 itself, is
modeled in more detail. The synthetic coal gas industry produces a perfect substitute for natural
gas. The oil shale industry produces a perfect substitute for refined oil. These “backstop”
technologies do not enter over the time periods analyzed here. All electricity generation
technologies produce perfectly substitutable electricity except for the “Solar&Wind” technology,
which is modeled as producing an imperfect substitute, reflecting its intermittent output. Biomass
use is included explicitly in electric generation and is implicit in the fuel demand structure of the
model. Among the Annex B countries, the energy efficiency of the electric sector is modeled as
improving at a rate of 0.40% to 0.45% per year while non-electric sectors increase in energy
efficiency by 1.2% to 1.3% per year.
The regional and sectoral disaggregation also is shown in Table 1. The Kyoto Annex B Parties
are aggregated into seven nations or multi-nation groups, including the U.S. Under this EPPA
aggregation the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are taken to represent those
economies that are in Annex B and thereby assuming a Kyoto commitment (principally Russia
and Ukraine). This aggregation is not exact, but the difference does not have a significant effect
on the results for cases considering foreign credits.
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Table 1. Countries, Regions, and Sectors in the MIT EPPA General Equilibrium Model
Country or Region Sectors
Annex B Non-Energy
United States Agriculture
Canada Services
Japan Energy Intensive products
European Union+a Other Industries products
Australia/New Zealand Energy
Former Soviet Unionb Coal
Eastern Europec Crude Oil
Non-Annex B Natural Gas
India Electric: Fossil, Nuclear, Hydro, Solar&Wind, Biomass
China Refined Oil
Indonesia Synthetic Gas from Coal
Higher Income East Asiad Oil from Shale
Mexico
Central and South America
Middle East
Africa
Rest of Worlde
a The European Union (EU-15) plus countries of the European Free Trade Area (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland).
b Russia and Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (which are included in Annex B), and Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan which are not.
The total carbon-equivalent emissions of these excluded regions were about 20% of those of the FSU in
1995. At COP-7, Kazakhstan, which makes up 5% to 10% of the FSU total ,joined Annex I and indicated its
intention to assume an Annex B target.
c Includes a number of former Yugoslav republics and Albania not Part of Annex B, which contribute only a
small percentage of the overall emissions of the Region.
d South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.
e All countries not included elsewhere: Turkey, and mostly Asian countries.
In this version of EPPA we do not yet have the capability to represent policies that discriminate
among economic sectors. We thus approximate the proposed Act as applying to the entire U.S.
economy either as a CO2-only policy or as a full greenhouse gas policy with trading among gases.
To minimize the effect on the carbon price of including the sectors excluded in the Act we use a cap
equal to economy-wide 2000 CO2 emissions rather than the cap specified in the Act, as the intent of
the Act is clearly to set a target equal to 2000 emissions of covered entities. Direct residential CO2
emissions were 5.5% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2000 and agriculture was 0.7%;
commercial CO2 emissions were 3.5% of total emissions (EPA, 2002, pp. 1-20). Assuming the
commercial sector’s CO2 emissions approximates the total of all non-covered entities, the total
non-covered CO2 emissions are about 9.7%. By altering the target to include the 2000 emissions
of these sectors, as a first approximation we expect no effect on the CO2-equivalent price3 and we
                                                 
3
 Assuming residential, agriculture, and commercial sector abatement opportunities and emissions growth from 2000
are on average similar to the rest of the economy.
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would expect costs in terms of welfare percentage or total dollar cost to be overestimated by
the 9.7% (approximately 10%) compared to the cost we would get if we modeled the sectoral
exemptions. These omitted sectors, and particularly agriculture, are more important because of
their emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. We structure a case with trading between CO2 and
other greenhouse gases to provide an estimate of how they might affect the cap-and-trade system
via reductions of these gases applied as credits. As previously discussed, the Act includes
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, and methane from fossil fuel
production under the cap. Thus, by including these only, as if they were credits, likely results in
a slight overestimate of the carbon-dioxide equivalent price and the economic cost of the Act.
In subsequent analyses we hope to approximate the specific sectoral exclusions contained in
the Act more closely. Given that these are relatively small, and given the other uncertainties, we
do not expect that the basic findings will differ substantially from those reported here. Another
variation from the Act is that we approximate Phase I as running from 2010 to the end of 2014
(rather than 2015 as in the Act) and we start Phase II in 2015 rather than 2016. We extend the
analysis through 2020. We assume that the Annex B Parties are meeting their Kyoto targets
using full flexibility of the trading mechanism and we assume that the Kyoto target for the first
commitment period remains unchanged (and no new Parties take on targets) through the 2020
horizon of our analysis. While likely not a large factor, there will be trade effects on the U.S. of
Annex B Party implementation: by assuming this in all scenarios, including the reference, we can
observe more clearly the economic effects on the U.S. of implementing the Act. The exception to
this is a case where we assume that Annex B-wide trading does not occur, and the U.S. program
links to an EU-wide trading system. Other Parties meet their targets domestically in this case, and
again, the Kyoto targets remain unchanged through the 2020 time horizon. To accurately assess
the economic impacts on the U.S., we compare the U.S. cost impacts in this case to a reference
where each of the Annex B parties meets their targets without trading among the Parties.
4. SCENARIOS AND RESULTS
To better understand the various components of Act we have constructed a set of scenarios
designed to show how each of its provisions affect its cost. Among the critical provisions are the
tightening of the cap in Phase II of the program, banking, and the various possibilities for credits
from outside the capped sectors and limits on their use. A first set of scenarios considers the cap
tightening in Phase II and banking. A second set of scenarios examines the possible effects of
outside credits. And a final set examines the effects of different assumptions about baseline gross
domestic product (GDP) and emissions growth. Table 2 identifies more specifically how each
scenario differs.
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Table 2. Summary of Scenario Variants
 Scenario Cap in Phase I Cap in Phase II Banking Source of Credits Growth Assumption
1 2000 CO2 emissions 2000 CO2 emissions No None EIA ref. CO2 emissions
2 2000 CO2 emissions 2000 CO2 emissions Yes None EIA ref. CO2 emissions
3 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions No None EIA ref. CO2 emissions
4 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions Yes None EIA ref. CO2 emissions
5 2000 GHG emissions 1990 GHG emissions Yes None EIA ref. CO2 emissions
6 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions No 15%, 10%
limits at $0 cost
EIA ref. CO2 emissions
7 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions Yes 15%, 10%
limits at $0 cost
EIA ref. CO2 emissions
8 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions No Non-CO2 GHGs
as economic
EIA ref. CO2 emissions
9 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions Yes Non-CO2 GHGs
as economic
EIA ref. CO2 emissions
10 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions No EU-wide only
Trading System
EIA ref. CO2 emissions
11 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions No Annex B wide
Trading System
EIA ref. CO2 emissions
12 2000 CO2 emissions 2000 CO2 emissions Yes Non-CO2 GHGs
as economic
EIA ref. CO2 emissions
13 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions No None Low GDP Growth
14 2000 CO2 emissions 1990 CO2 emissions No None High GDP Growth
For the central runs (all those except the variations in GDP and emissions growth) we have
benchmarked the EPPA model to produce a reference greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions forecast
nearly identical to the Energy Information Administration’s (US DOE, 2003) central forecast for
the U.S. GDP and emissions growth outside the U.S. remain as in the EPPA reference.
We report results in terms of the price per ton CO2-e and percentage welfare loss. To avoid
any potential confusion when comparing our results to other studies that may report in terms of
carbon-equivalent (C-e) we also report prices in C-e in brackets in the tables. These differ by a
constant factor (3.67) reflecting the relative molecular weight of CO2 to C. Choice of CO2-e or
C-e is simply a matter of convention. All values are in 1997 constant dollars. Welfare is measured
as equivalent variation, and is equivalent to loss in macroeconomic (personal) consumption. To
obtain absolute dollar costs of the welfare loss the percentage can be multiplied by an estimate
of U.S. consumption for the years shown. Economists generally prefer welfare loss as the best
measure of the real cost to the economy of a policy because it is the most accurate measure of the
loss of effective income of households—lost income in terms of households’ ability to purchase
goods and services. Table 3 provides the necessary data to place these percentage losses in
perspective. A 0.1% welfare loss would be about $69 per household in 2010, rising to $87 per
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Table 3. Reference U.S. Consumption, Household Income (in 1997 dollars)
2000 2010 2015 2020
Private Consumption ($ trillions) 6.3 8.2 9.5 11.1
Aggregate cost of 0.1% loss ($ billions) 6.3 8.2 9.5 11.1
Households (millions) 108a 118b 123b 127b
Cost/household of 0.1% loss ($) 69 77 87
Median Household Income ($) 41,000a 49,000b 55000b 61,000b
a Bureau of Census Data (http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h06.html). Household income deflated
to 1997 dollars using U.S. GDP implicit price deflator, rounded to nearest 1000.
b Estimated using EPPA population and income growth per capita to index 2000 base year Census estimates.
household in 2020. At the same time median household income would rise from $40,000 in 2000
to $49,000 in 2010, and $61,000 in 2020 based on the EPPA forecast for the reference scenario of
GDP growth.
For the banking scenarios (2, 4, 5, 7, 9) we show how petroleum product, coal, and gas
consumption are affected by the policy. For these same scenarios we report on the potential value
of exceeding the CAFE limits by 20% or more, using the approach described previously. In all
scenarios, we assume a free distribution of allowances or a lump sum distribution of auction
revenues that does not include possible benefits from a recycling of revenue to reduce
distortionary taxes on labor or capital.
4.1 Effects of Tightening the Target in Phase II, and Banking
We start with a scenario constructed as if the Phase I targets continued indefinitely. We are
thus able to see the effects of tightening the target in Phase II, and how the benefits of banking
depend on the future constraint. The results, in terms of the price per ton CO2-e and percentage
welfare loss are given in Table 4. Assuming the Phase I target was to remain unchanged in
Table 4. Effects of Banking and Tightening of the Target in Phase II (in 1997 dollars)
$/ton CO2-e [$/ton C-e]
Scenario Cost 2010 2015 2020
(1) Phase I target indefinitely,
no banking, CO2 only
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
16 [59]
0.05
28 [103]
0.13
41 [150]
0.18
(2) Phase I target indefinitely,
banking, CO2 only
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
21 [77]
0.09
27 [99]
0.12
34 [125]
0.13
(3) Phase I and II target,
no banking, CO2 only
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
16 [59]
0.05
70 [257]
0.49
86 [316]
0.59
(4) Phase I and II target, banking,
CO2 only
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
39 [143]
0.25
49 [180]
0.34
63 [231]
0.40
(5) Phase I and II target, banking,
applied to all GHGs
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
25 [92]
0.14
32 [117]
0.20
40 [147]
0.25
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Phase II, through to 2020, and in the absence of banking, we find the CO2-e price to start at $16
per ton in 2010, rising to $28 in 2015 and then rising more gradually to 2020. (The same prices,
stated in $ per ton of C-e are shown in brackets.)
Next we add banking, which we model on the assumption that market participants will bank
emissions allowances as long as the expected price is rising more rapidly than an economy-wide
rate of return of 5%. The intuition for this equilibrium condition is that an entity faced with the
decision to abate and bank in Phase I, would compare the expected return on that abatement
investment with the rate of return elsewhere in the economy. If the CO2-e price were rising more
rapidly than 5% per year, abatement investments yield a higher return than the 5% elsewhere in
the economy and entities would thus abate and bank more.4 We have enforced this CO2-e price
banking equilibrium through the 2020 horizon of our model run; examination of post-2020
results suggest some remaining incentive to bank, and therefore if we were to extend the
horizon of the model the equilibrium prices for the reported years would be slightly higher.5
The results show limited incentive to bank when the target is not tightened in Phase II. The
Phase I CO2-e price rises by $5, and falls slightly compared with the no-banking (scenario 1)
case in 2015 and 2020. The benefits of banking in terms of welfare costs are also seen in 2015
and 2020, at the expense of somewhat higher costs in 2010. The welfare costs of these scenarios
are small, starting at around 1/10 of 1% and rising slowly.
One of reasons for the low welfare costs of this restriction is that the U.S. is a large importer
of crude oil and petroleum products. It thus influences the world oil market, causing world oil
prices to fall when oil consumption is restrained through a CO2 policy. These effects are more
pronounced if the developed countries act together to limit oil consumption, and as discussed
previously, we have assumed the Kyoto Parties are meeting their Kyoto commitment (unchanged
through 2020) using full flexibility of international trading, in all scenarios except scenario 10
where Annex B Parties meet their targets without trading. This policy scenario thus has an oil
market effect. But, we compared the welfare costs of the U.S. policy to a reference case where the
Kyoto Parties implement the Protocol while the U.S. does nothing. With trading among Annex B
Parties, the Kyoto commitment requires very little reduction of CO2 emissions in 2010, and thus
                                                 
4
 Since EPPA is recursive dynamic rather than forward-looking the model does not automatically solve for optimal
banking. The results here were numerically approximated by reallocating the target over time to yield the
equilibrium condition that the price is rising at the 5% rate of return. Entities will make this choice themselves
based on their expectations and perception of risks. Assuming a higher rate of return would tilt the price path to
lower prices in the early years, and higher prices in later years—there would be less banking. Assuming a lower
rate of return would create more banking, and higher early year prices and lower later year prices.
5
 Given growth in emissions, we would expect the incentive to bank to gradually disappear, if the Phase II cap were
extended indefinitely. The specific incentive to bank would depend on what, if any, specific information became
available over time on the likely cap beyond Phase II, and on the expectations of entities regarding the resulting
costs in these later years.
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there is little effect on the oil market and the U.S. Very small effects on the U.S., on the order
of 0.01% welfare benefit, occur in 2020 when the Kyoto targets require greater CO2 reductions
among the Parties. Thus, any oil market benefits from the Kyoto Protocol already exist in the
reference, and so any further oil market benefits are the result solely of reduced U.S. demand on
the world oil market.
Scenarios 3 and 4 in Table 4 show the effect of implementing the Phase II targets, returning to
1990 emissions levels in Phase II. Without banking, the costs are the same in 2010 as in the no
banking scenario—it is the exact same constraint for that period—but the costs in 2015 more
than quadruple in terms of the CO2-e price from 2010, and the welfare loss rises to about 1/2 of
1%. The benefits of banking are thus far more substantial, cutting the loss in welfare in the 2015
and 2020 periods by almost 1/3. The CO2-e price rises in the 2010 period from $16 to $39 as a
result of banking. For comparison purposes, and to bound the results in terms of inclusion or
exclusion of the non-CO2 greenhouse gases, we include a scenario 5 where the target is expanded
to all greenhouse gases. As expected based on previous work, this reduces the costs compared to
the equivalent CO2-only case. We show only the case with banking and with the tightening of the
target in Phase II; the magnitude of the effect is similar in other cases.
4.2 The Potential Effects of Outside Credits
As already introduced briefly in early sections, it can be difficult to create a credit system that
can efficiently take advantage of low cost reductions from uncapped sources without letting in
credits that, in reality, involve no real reduction in emissions or increase in sinks beyond what
would have occurred without the credit incentive. If the reference level of emissions (or sinks)
from which reductions (or further increases in sinks) are scrutinized very carefully, requiring
extensive study and documentation, the process may be so burdensome that few entities find it
worthwhile. If simple rules are set then the system may self-select entities that would have reduced
their emissions in any case, or it may reflect actions that create leakage. For example, if historical
emissions in a year prior to Phase I were specified as the reference, those entities whose emissions
may have been declining for other reasons would gets credits for these reductions even though
these were not a real reduction from what their reference emissions would have been. Or, entities
may make a decision not to expand or to reduce a part of their production activities that have high
emissions. But demand for that product is likely to continue to exist, and so other entities with
similar production capability, but who have chosen not to seek credits, are likely to expand their
production and emissions. These phenomena are minimized in a broad cap-and-trade system
because covered entities do not have a choice of whether to participate or not. Some leakage can
occur when the cap-and-trade system is not complete (geographically, or covering all entities)
but with sufficiently broad coverage this leakage may not be extreme.
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Rather than identifying all possible credits from foreign cap-and-trade systems, domestic
exempt entities, and sinks in a single scenario, we bracket the possible effects by considering
each of these separately, with differing assumptions about how well the credit system might
work, and whether it would produce credits that involve additional reductions at some additional
real cost to the economy.
In scenarios 6 and 7, reported in Table 5, we assume that the credits are generated at no cost;
we simply relax the cap by 15% in Phase I and by 10% in Phase II. As noted previously, there
was an estimated 902 tons of net CO2 sequestration in the U.S. in 2000. This was 13% of total U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions in 2000 or slightly over 15% of total CO2 emissions. A crediting system,
if it adopted zero sequestration as a reference for any single entity, might well end up with credits
from sequestration considerably greater than the estimate of net sequestration; net emitters would
not register, and potentially all of gross sequestration could be registered. Sequestration alone
could thus completely supply credits up to the 15% and 10% limits at no real cost to the economy
and no additional net sequestration. If the 15% and 10% limits are binding (there was excess
supply) one might expect the credit price to be near zero, even though there would be a positive
price on allowances. Under such circumstance the no-cost sequestration would dominate other
costly reductions (from non-CO2 greenhouse gases or from a foreign trading system) and there
would be virtually no incentive to reduce these emissions. Of course, zero cost credits might also
be available through the foreign trading system if large quantities of Russian hot air were put on
Table 5. Effects of Credits, Phase I and II Targets, Except as Noted (in 1997 dollars)
$/ton CO2-e [$/ton C-e]
Scenario Cost 2010 2015 2020
(6) No Banking, 0-cost credits to
15 and 10% limits
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
0 [0]
0.00
49 [180]
0.30
62 [228]
0.36
(7) Banking, 0-cost credits to 15
and 10% limits
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
20 [73]
0.09
26 [95]
0.11
34 [125]
0.13
(8) No banking, non-CO2 credits
as economic
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
4 [15]
--a
34 [125]
0.19
43 [158]
0.22
(9) Banking, non-CO2 credits as
economic
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
17 [62]
0.07
22 [81]
0.09
28 [103]
0.11
(10) No Banking, CO2-only, credits
from EU trading
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
17 [62]
0.05
47 [172]
0.46
54 [198]
0.57
(11) No Banking, CO2-only, credits
from Annex B trading
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
8 [29]
0.05
26 [95]
0.37
32 [117]
0.47
(12) Phase I indefinitely, banking,
non-CO2 credits
Price
Welfare Cost (%)
8 [29]
0.02
10 [37]
0.02
13 [48]
0.02
a Rounds to zero.
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offer, or through the domestic exempt sector’s credits if reference levels for non-CO2 reductions
were set very generously.
The results for the no banking case (scenario 6) shows that the 15% credit allowance
essentially makes the cap non-binding in 2010; that is, in the reference emissions are growing
by less than 15%. The tightening of this limit to 10% and continued growth in emissions leads
the cap to bind in 2015 and after. Even though the Phase I cap is not binding by itself, under the
banking provision entities would abate in Phase I to bank the allowances for later years, as
shown in scenario 7. Thus, we end up with a price of $20 per ton CO2-e in 2010 with banking.
We then considered non-CO2 greenhouse gases as a source of credits. Here we constrained the
non-CO2 greenhouse gases at the reference emissions in each year and allowed any reductions
from this reference to be treated as credits. This is easy to do in a modeling exercise because we
can easily produce a scenario with and without a policy constraint. In reality, implementation
would require an accurate projection for each entity, and essentially would require forcing each
entity into the credit system to avoid leakage. Of course as we have constructed the case the
system would operate like allowance trading. It therefore does not capture the extra cost and
problems associated with establishing a reference level of emissions from which reductions
would be calculated. In evaluating the SO2 trading system, Ellerman et al. (2000) found that the
transparency of trading allowances rather than reductions was one the reasons why that system
worked well.
These scenarios (8 and 9) show that potential credits from non-CO2 greenhouse gases are
substantial and would exceed the 10% limit in 2015 and later. In these cases, we have not
explicitly enforced the limits, but we can compare the result to scenarios 6 and 7 to see
whether the limits are exceeded. Since scenario 6 has a zero price, we can see that the non-CO2
greenhouse gas no-banking scenario 8 has a higher price, and thus has not exceeded the 15%
limit. However, in succeeding years the price is lower than in scenario 6, and similarly the
banking scenario prices are lower in all years than in scenario 7. Thus, not all of these reductions
could, in fact, be credited under the current provisions of the Act. We should note, however, that
this result may depend on our simplifying the coverage of the cap-and-trade system. We assumed
all non-CO2 greenhouse gases would enter as credits, whereas methane (some sources, such as
from fossil fuel production), and the hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride would in reality fall under the cap. We also considered non-CO2 greenhouse gas
credits under a scenario where the Phase I targets remain through to 2020, with banking. Results
are shown for this case under scenario 12 in Table 5, and, to see the specific effect of adding
credits, these results can be compared to scenario 2 in Table 4. In this scenario, the initial CO2-e
price is $8/ton and it rises to $13/ton in 2020. The welfare cost rounds to 0.02% in all years, the
least costly policy scenario we considered. This is about $15 to $20 per household per year.
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Scenarios 10 and 11 consider the possibilities of linking with a foreign trading system. Scenario
10 estimates the effects of linking to an EU-wide trading system. For these purposes we assume a
cap-and-trade system covering the entire EU economy, rather than the limited sectoral coverage
that is actually being developed. As noted earlier, the problem for analyzing the proposed EU
system is that the cap for these sectors has not been specified. Here we assume the EU is meeting
its Kyoto target domestically. We have further assumed that other Annex B Parties achieve their
Kyoto targets domestically. The interesting result here is that the CO2-e price falls as a result of
trading compared with case 3—the U.S. is an allowance buyer—but we do not see a reduction in
welfare costs, instead they increase slightly. One reason is that this case is not directly comparable
to scenario 3. The difference is that in scenario 3 the Annex B parties were meeting the target with
trading and, as discussed earlier, there was little oil market effect because not much reduction in
CO2 emissions is required. When Parties meet the target without trading there are significant oil
market effects, with the world oil prices falling. With lower world oil prices, the U.S. consumed
somewhat more oil and therefore it needed to reduce more to meet the cap than in scenario 3.
We ran the directly comparable case, no trading among Annex B parties and no U.S. trade with
the EU, to check whether there were indeed gains from international trading if we made a direct
comparison. There are slight gains in scenario 10 compared with the welfare losses in that scenario.
The gains, however, are of only a few percentage points, far smaller than the gains we observe from
the domestic credit systems. The reason is that, in a trading system, the buyer pays the market-
clearing price for all allowances, even when the marginal cost of some of the abatement is much
less than the market-clearing price. The extra amount above the cost of each unit of abatement is an
economic surplus transferred from buyer to seller. With international trading, and the U.S. buying,
this economic surplus is lost to the U.S. economy as it is transferred abroad. In the domestic credit
system, economic surplus is also paid from allowance purchasers to the credit sellers, but it is a
transfer that occurs between domestic parties and so it is not lost from the U.S. economy.
One can also observe the surplus transfer effect in scenario 11. In this case, scenario 3 is
directly comparable. In both cases, there is Annex B-wide trading. When the U.S. trades with this
system, the allowance price fall substantially. There are welfare benefits but they end up rounding
to zero in 2010 and are only 0.12 percentage points in 2015 and 2020. This can be contrasted with
the 2015 result in scenario 7 where credits are obtained domestically. Coincidentally it has the
same CO2-e price as scenario 11 in 2015. The welfare gain, compared with scenario 3 in that year
from the lower CO2-e price is 0.38 percentage points.
4.3 Sensitivity to GDP and Emissions Growth Projections
Economic growth (and as a result emissions growth) is variable and uncertain. Over the longer
term the U.S. has an average annual growth rate of GDP 3.4% (1959-99) but annual growth rates
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for a single decade were as low as 2.4% (1972-82) and as high as 4.4% (1959-69).6 Average growth
over a decade can be highly dependent on choice of endpoint. Coincidentally, we can now look
back to the year 2000 and see that that was near the peak of a boom cycle: to make up for little
growth over the past few years, growth in the remaining part of the decade will need to be more
rapid than average. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA)
reference GDP growth projection in the 2003 Energy Outlook averaged 2.9% per year from 2000
to 2010 (US DOE, 2003). For the previous scenarios we have benchmarked growth in the EPPA
model to that level, and also adjusted energy efficiency improvements to get similar emissions
growth as in the EIA forecast. Costs of a cap-and-trade system are quite sensitive to the baseline
projection of growth in emissions. To study this sensitivity we have altered EPPA GDP growth to
generate emissions scenarios very similar to the EIA high and low growth emissions scenarios.
We then introduce the Phase I and Phase II caps. We do not introduce banking in these scenarios,
but based on the previous results the general implications of banking can be easily deduced.
In Table 6 we present results showing how the economic cost depends on the emissions growth
assumptions. In the low growth scenario, both the CO2-e prices and the percentage loss in economic
welfare are 20% to 30% lower compared with the comparable scenario 3 with reference growth in
emissions. Of course, with lower growth the absolute level of economic consumption is lower and
so the absolute cost is reduced even further. Compared to the costs using reference growth
assumptions, the costs with high emissions growth rise by about 20% to 25%, and rise more than
that in terms of the percentage welfare cost. In this case, of course, future welfare and consumption
are higher because of the rapid GDP growth and so the absolute increase in cost is greater than
the increase in the percentage cost. In the end, of course, the economy and consumers would be in
much better shape with high economic growth and high mitigation costs than with low economic
growth and low mitigation costs. These scenarios indicate, however, how sensitive estimates of
the carbon price and welfare costs of a policy are to growth projections.
Other factors also would likely contribute to uncertainty in costs, such as availability of
technology, energy prices, and changes in consumers’ habits, but in sensitivity analysis, by far
Table 6. Effects of Varying Economic and Emissions Growth in the U.S. (in 1997 dollars)
$/ton CO2-e  [$/ton C-e]
Scenario Cost 2010 2015 2020
(13) Low growth, no banking, CO2 only Price
Welfare Cost (%)
12 [44]
0.03
60 [219]
0.40
70 [258]
0.44
(14) High growth, no banking, CO2 only Price
Welfare Cost (%)
20 [74]
0.08
82 [300]
0.61
106 [387]
0.77
                                                 
6
 Calculated from data in the U.S. Economic Report of the President, 2000, Table 308.
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the most important factor creating uncertainty in emissions growth within the EPPA model is the
rate of economic growth (Webster et al., 2002) and reference emissions, in turn, is one of the
most important factors in uncertainty in costs. Also, note that we used high and low GDP growth
assumptions assumed in EIA analyses, where they also produce high and low emissions scenarios.
However, in the EPPA model altering the GDP growth assumptions produces a much wider range
of emissions growth than in the EIA projections. These differences represent structural differences
in the modeling systems. We note the difference because, had we instead re-benchmarked EPPA
to the high and low emissions growth scenarios of the EIA, the emissions range (and resultant
costs) would have been narrower. Ideally, a more complete uncertainty analysis would be
conducted to estimate mean and standard errors of the cost estimates.
4.4 Fuel Market Effects
Table 7 shows the effects on petroleum products, coal, and gas consumption in the U.S. as
projected in the EPPA model under the policy scenarios given. We provide these estimates for the
banking scenarios. The results are consistent with the expected effects of CO2 and greenhouse gas
Table 7. Effects of the Policy on Fuel Consumption (exajoules)
Case 2000 2010 2015 2020
Petroleum Products Ref 39 44 48 50
    Consumption 2 39 39 41 42
4 39 36 37 38
5 39 38 40 41
7 39 39 41 42
9 39 40 42 43
12 39 42 45 46
Coal Consumption Ref 24 28 30 34
2 24 21 21 21
4 24 19 18 18
5 24 20 20 21
7 24 21 21 22
9 24 22 22 23
12 24 24 25 27
Gas Consumption Ref 22 24 26 27
2 22 23 24 25
4 22 21 23 24
5 22 22 23 24
7 22 23 24 25
9 22 23 23 25
12 22 24 25 26
Note: The supplemental data on physical energy flows in GTAP 5.0 are from the International Energy Agency
(IEA) Energy Balance Tables, and differs from EIA estimates of energy use. The difference is largest for natural
gas and petroleum products. For details on the GTAP use of IEA data, see Dimaranan and McDougal (2002).
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mitigation policies. In general, when compared to the reference projections coal use falls the
most and natural gas the least, reflecting the relatively high CO2 emissions from burning coal
and relatively lower emissions from gas. Oil is intermediate. While the extra cost of carbon
allowances for gas act to reduce consumption of it, there is also a tendency to substitute toward
gas and away from coal in the electric sector. We find the net effect of these two factors to be a
reduction in gas consumption compared to the reference, but a relatively small one. Compared
with year 2000 use of fuels, both oil and gas consumption continue to grow in the policy cases,
with the exception being scenario 4. On the other hand, coal use declines by as much as 1/3
(scenario 4). Not surprisingly scenario 4 produces the largest impacts on the fuel markets
because this is the case with the tightest caps, and no credits from outside the allowance trading
system. If credits are available, not surprisingly, it reduces the effects on fuel markets.
The economic value of this reduction in welfare terms can be estimated by multiplying the
drop in the imported oil times the quantity of oil imports. The bounding scenarios are 4 and 12.
The oil market benefits are about $2.4 billion in 2010, rising to over $4.0 billion in 2020 in
scenario 4. The CO2-e price is much lower in scenario 12, and thus the oil market effects are only
$0.6 billion in 2010 rising to $1.5 billion in 2020.
4.5 The Value of Exceeding CAFE Requirements
Using the approach previously described, we estimated the potential value per vehicle if an
automobile manufacturer’s fleet were to exceed the CAFE standard by the 20% set out in the Act.
We also calculated the marginal benefit of additional 1 mile per gallon (mpg) improvements.
For this purpose we assumed average vehicle lifetime mileage for gasoline-powered cars and light
trucks as used in the U.S. EPA greenhouse inventory (EPA, 2002, Table D-4). We calculated
these values only for the banking scenarios, as the methodology we use assumes banking, and
would be inconsistent with the non-banking scenarios. We estimated the value per vehicle sold
in 2010. For future years, the value would escalate proportionally with the CO2-e price, using our
method, and assuming future targets were such that banking continued, at least for the vehicle
lifetime. As seen in Table 8, the incentive per car to exceed the current CAFE limit by 20%
ranges from about $200 to $450, and for light trucks the value ranges from about $300 to $670.
The marginal value of further exceeding the standard drops to about $30 to $70 for an additional
1 mpg improvement for cars, and to about $60 to $130 for light trucks. The marginal values
decline slowly as mileage improves.
As noted earlier, we have not assessed in any way the potential responsiveness of vehicle
manufactures to such credits. We therefore have not estimated the potential magnitude of the
credits, and the impact on the market for allowances of this provision of the Act, but it would
have two effects on the market. To the extent fuel efficiency of some vehicles were improved it
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Table 8. Potential Value in 2010 of Exceeding by 20% the Current CAFE Standards for
Light Duty Gas Vehicles (cars) of 27.5 mpg and Light Duty Gas Trucks of 20.7 mpg
Marginal value for additional
1 mpg improvement
Marginal value for additional
1 mpg improvement
Case
2010
CO2-e
Price
Exceed
car fleet
CAFE mpg
by 20%
34
mpg
35
mpg
36
mpg
Exceed
truck fleet
CAFE mpg
by 20%
25.9
mpg
26.9
mpg
27.9
mpg
2 21 $245 $36 $34 $32 $360 $70 $64 $60
4 39 $455 $67 $63 $60 $668 $129 $120 $111
5 25 $291 $43 $40 $38 $428 $83 $77 $71
7 20 $233 $34 $32 $31 $342 $66 $61 $57
9 17 $198 $29 $27 $26 $291 $56 $52 $48
12 8 $93 $14 $13 $12 $137 $26 $24 $23
would reduce energy use and CO2 emissions, and thus fewer allowances would be needed to
cover transportation fuel sales. This would lower the allowance price. Further, since the credits
could be used in lieu of allowances, they would further reduce the allowance price. Both of these
effects would then lower the partial equilibrium incentive we calculated in Table 8. Use of the
vehicle fuel efficiency credits is also potentially limited under the 15% (Phase I) and 10%
(Phase II) limits on the use of credits. If these limits are binding then we would expect the credit
market clearance price to be below the allowance market clearance price. As discussed above,
a generous interpretation for sequestration credits could essentially drive the credit market
clearance price to near zero, squeezing out the other credits sources, and dropping to near zero
the value of these credits for more efficient vehicles.
5. SUMMARY
The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 is the most developed proposal for instituting a cap-
and-trade system in the U.S. to control greenhouse gas emissions. It would cover perhaps 90%
of CO2 emission and somewhat less of all greenhouse gas emissions. The cap for Phase I (2010-
2015) would return covered sources to 2000 emissions levels, and for Phase II (2016-2020)
would return to 1990 emissions. The Phase II tightening of the cap is substantial and means that
the banking provision is quite important in reducing overall costs. The implication, however, is
that the total cost and the CO2-equivalent price are much higher during the Phase I period than
they would have been if the cap remained at its Phase I level. We were not able to exactly
replicate the specific sectoral exemptions specified in the Act, and the operation of the credit
system depends on specific details of implementation. It could yield few credits, or credits at
virtually no cost up to the limits in the Act. A possible reasonable bound, for reference
projections of GDP and emissions growth, on the costs of the Act with Phase II tightening of
the target, are those given by scenario 4 (no credits) and scenario 9 (greenhouse gas credits as
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economic), both with banking. Based on these scenarios an estimate of the cost of the Act as it is
currently written would be a CO2-equivalent price ranging from under $20 to nearly $40 in 2010,
rising to about $30 to $65 by 2020. These estimates may be slightly low because an examination
of years beyond 2020 suggests an incentive for further banking of allowances in early years for
future Phases, even in the case that the target in future Phases remained at the Phase II level.
The loss to the economy, measured as welfare loss (or approximate loss in macroeconomic
consumption) is on the order of 0.07% to 0.25% in 2010, rising to 0.11% to 0.40% in 2020 in
these two cases. This would translate to an annual loss of about $50 to $175 per household in
2010, rising to about $100 to $350 per household in 2020. In contrast, when the target does not
tighten in Phase II and credits from the non-CO2 greenhouse gases are available the average cost
per household remains below $20 per year.
As is obvious from these ranges, the credit provisions of the Act could significantly reduce the
costs. If not designed carefully, credits could represent no real reduction and simply a relaxation
of the cap. The biggest source of such “no-reduction” credits could be sequestration. Current
sequestration of 902 million tons of CO2 per year is occurring simply because forests harvested
decades ago have been left to regrow. This sequestration alone could supply the entire 15% limit
on credits in Phase I of the program. And, because these do not fall under the cap it may be
difficult to assure that sequestration does not remain a source of “no-reduction” credits for many
years. If the entire forest sector were brought under the cap, even if it were given credit for
sequestration currently occurring it would at least create an incentive for real reductions beyond
the “no-reduction” credits. Also, it would establish a more complete monitoring and inventory
system for entities with large forest and land holdings. Non-CO2 greenhouse gases also could be
a substantial source of real reductions, but if the “no-reduction” forest sequestration is credited
these reductions will be crowded out.
The foreign credit system is largely a wild-card at this point because it remains unclear what it
will look like, who will participate, and, thus, what clearing price might emerge. Apart from having
a poor fix on Annex B trading prices in the first commitment period, targets and participation in
the second period have not been discussed yet, and so these are highly speculative. Moreover,
there is an economic advantage to the U.S. to obtain these credits from domestic sources.
Finally, as with any cap-and-trade system, assuming it is enforced and not subject to leakage,
one can know with more or less certainty what the emissions will be but the costs of meeting that
cap can vary greatly depending on how the economy grows. If the economy and emissions grow
much more rapidly than projected in current reference projections, the costs could easily be 25 or
35% higher than our reference estimates. On the other hand, slow growth could reduce the costs
of meeting the target. Of course, even with the higher costs of limiting greenhouse gas emissions,
the economy would be far better off with, than without, more rapid economic growth.
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